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1 
Introduction 
  
The Tupamaros, also known as the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional – Tupamaros 
(MLN-T) was a revolutionary movement in Uruguay in the 1960s and 1970s. Using guerrilla 
warfare, the Tupamaros hoped to overthrow the government and remove repressive elements 
from Uruguayan society. Using a combination of military and political activity, the Tupamaros 
became the most successful urban guerrilla group in Latin America. This study explores the 
Tupamaros’ rise, which reached a climax in 1969 and their subsequent fall in 1970 when the 
Tupamaros commenced their revolution with an assault against Uruguay’s oppressive forces, 
leading to the country’s military dictatorship in 1973. 
Nestled in the southern cone of South America between Brazil and Argentina lies a small 
nation known for its tranquil existence. Uruguayans will proudly tell you that it is the best nation 
in the world. The country has been called “the Switzerland of America” and a “Picture of 
Democracy” by its admirers, titles which are perpetuated by Uruguayans themselves.1 Generally, 
the country has been praised for being “a country traditionally pacifist, prosperous and with great 
democratic traditions.”2 Uruguay was blessed with a history of a strong socialist democracy with 
a policy of social justice that has manifested in a number of progressive reforms. 
Beginning in the early twentieth century, Uruguay was viewed as a utopia in a region rife 
with corruption, poverty, repression and violence. To Western observers, Uruguay was an 
exemplar for the rest of Latin America to follow. In reality, this was a racist interpretation of the 
region, considering the fact that over half of Uruguayans are direct descendants of European 
                                                          
1 Maria Esther Gilio, The Tupamaro Guerrillas, trans. Anne Edmondson (New York: Saturday Morning Press, 
1972), 13. 
2 Major Carlos Wilson, The Tupamaros: The Unmentionables (Boston: Branden Press, 1974), 15. 
2 
immigrants, largely from Spain, France, Germany and Italy.3 This perception of exceptionalism 
has persisted both internationally and within Uruguay, alienating the country from the rest of 
Latin America. 
Uruguay has never been perfect or anything of the sort. It has never ceased to be Latin 
America, despite the trouble that its leaders went through to Europeanize it. The famous 
slogan of “the Switzerland of South America” is purely an Uruguayan fabrication, 
invented for precisely that end: to ostracize it from the whole of America, to make it 
appear as a rare case. Uruguay went through a reformative era which was the fruit of a 
certain economic prosperity that allowed its government to create a fictitious atmosphere 
of social welfare that kept us mesmerized for a long time. But it has never ceased to be a 
dictatorship of class and when the time of prosperity passed, “Socialism” ended and the 
people were forced to bear the burden of the crisis.4 
  
In this manner, Uruguay was not unlike the rest of Latin America. By the mid-twentieth century, 
Uruguay was plagued by a failing economy and increasing disparity between the rich and the 
poor. Corruption was rampant, considering that the country was run by oligarchies. Considering 
this, it wasn’t unreasonable that radical Uruguayans considered the possibility of revolutionary 
action, inspired by their Latin American neighbors. These sentiments culminated in the creation 
of the Tupamaros in 1963. 
The Tupamaros began preparing for the revolution with a number of captivating 
operations designed to garner public support and humiliate Uruguay’s political and business 
elite. In this manner, the Tupamaros became Robin Hood figures, acting in the interest of the 
poor and working classes of the country. This preparatory period of the Tupamaros’ history was 
                                                          
3 Wilson, The Tupamaros, 22. 
4 Ibid, 16. 
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their most romantic and memorable. By 1970, the Tupamaros determined that conditions were 
right to ignite the revolution through a violent campaign of kidnappings and murders. Through a 
series of miscalculations, the Tupamaros lost their public support. In this sense, the Tupamaros’ 
fall is more important than their rise to power, considering the fact that it represented their actual 
goal of revolution. Moreover, the Tupamaros’ attempted revolution against the state led to the 
imposition of emergency powers and martial law, allowing the military to defeat the Tupamaros 
by the end of 1972. Despite the fact that lawlessness was brought to an end, the military had 
become politicized in their fight against the Tupamaros, leading the armed forces to take power 
in 1973.   
In my study of the Tupamaros, the majority of the sources I have used are journalistic. 
The periodicals largely focus on the Tupamaros’ exploits, which provide compelling tales of 
bank heists, kidnappings and shootouts. Other journalists sympathetic to the Tupamaros’ cause 
have written longer accounts to explain the Tupamaros to audiences unfamiliar with their 
organization and Uruguay as a whole. The other sources I utilized are American intelligence 
reports from the National Security Archives, which were declassified in 2005 under the Freedom 
of Information Act. In general, there is little scholarly work written about the Tupamaros, 
considering the fact that Uruguay is often overlooked in Latin American literature and viewed as 
an exception to the region. 
Considering the narrative of exceptionalism surrounding Uruguay and the Tupamaros, I 
hope to connect the two into the narrative of Latin America’s era of guerrilla groups and 
authoritarian military dictatorships. “The Tupamaros: Uruguay’s Light Bearers” follows the rise 
of Uruguay in the early twentieth century and its subsequent decline, leading to the conditions 
that produced revolutionary fervor within the country. The Tupamaros successfully enlightened 
4 
the Uruguayan population of their plight through a sequence of brilliant operations, gaining a 
significant following. They then proceeded with the revolution, which culminates in “Plan Satán: 
The Fall from Grace.” In this chapter, I have developed an account of the kidnapping of Daniel 
Mitrione, as the Uruguayan state and the Tupamaros struggled to take control of the country. My 
study concludes with “Uruguay’s Moral Decline,” an analysis of the connection between the 
kidnapping of Daniel Mitrione and the end of democracy within Uruguay. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
The Tupamaros: Uruguay’s Light Bearers 
  
In the nineteenth century, Uruguay was fragmented by two political parties: the Blancos 
and Colorados. Generally, the Blanco party has been thought to represent rural interests, while 
the Colorados represented the urban interests of Montevideo, but each had a sizeable pull in both 
sectors.5 Historically, the Blancos and Colorados have retained roughly half of the electorate, 
meaning that the two parties were constantly in conflict as they tried to retain control of the 
country. In 1839, the Colorados declared war on the Blancos, beginning a twelve year civil war 
known as La Guerra Grande. The Blancos had the upper hand; they had taken Montevideo. This 
led the Colorados to sign an agreement with Brazil, allowing them the right to intervene in 
Uruguay’s affairs, bringing the war to an end in 1851. In the years that followed, there were 
several uprisings against the government as caudillo rulers on both sides tried to take control of 
the nation for their respective party. Altogether, twenty-five leaders ruled the country from 1830 
to 1903; two were assassinated and ten were forced out of power.6 
While Uruguay was in turmoil due to political warring, the country was otherwise doing 
well. Uruguay experienced an economic boom due to the Paraguayan War and increasing trade 
with Europe. The country had a rise in population as a result of Italian and Spanish immigration. 
The era of caudillismo came to an end in 1897, when the Blancos led a civil conflict against the 
Colorados, who had been in power since 1865. The Colorados conceded, offering the Blancos 
more representation. By the beginning of the twentieth century, Uruguay was moving towards a 
modern state after a destructive period of contention.  
                                                          
5 Arthur P. Whitaker, The United States and the Southern Cone: Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1976), 50. 
6 Wilson, The Tupamaros, 22. 
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In 1903, a new president came to power, representing the Colorado party. José Batlle y 
Ordóñez was unique for during his two terms in office (1903 – 1907 and 1911 – 1915), he 
introduced a number of progressive reforms that led Uruguay on a new path of progressivism 
and democracy. Batlle’s first term was devoted to improving the economy through foreign 
investment and recovering from civil conflict, as the Blancos had led another revolt.7 During his 
second term, Batlle used the economic prosperity to introduce a number of reforms. To begin 
with, Batlle modeled the country after Switzerland’s socialist structure, mimicking its economic 
and political system.8 His most important impact on Uruguay were his efforts to minimize the 
gap between the rich and poor through social welfare, education and organized labor. Education 
went through massive reform, ensuring equal access to secondary and higher education, which 
was now free to all.9 Meanwhile, trade unions’ rights were guaranteed and protective legislation 
was provided for workers, including the implementation of an eight-hour day and six-day week, 
regulated working conditions and a minimum wage.10 These were coupled with other economic 
reforms and prosperity, allowing Uruguay to extend welfare and social security to the country. 
Uruguay was at its peak, now home to a social democracy and a booming economy. With 
the Great War consuming Europe, Uruguay prospered greatly through the export of agricultural 
necessities, such as beef, wool and wheat. More funds were provided by the newly nationalized 
assets and infrastructure, including insurance companies, electricity and power, petroleum and 
alcohol.11 With these newly acquired funds, President Batlle worked to provide social security 
                                                          
7 Whitaker, The United States and the Southern Cone, 106. 
8 Wilson, The Tupamaros, 22. 
9 Juan A. Oddone, “The Formation of Modern Uruguay, c 1870 - 1930,” trans. Dr. Richard Southern, in The 
Cambridge History of Latin America, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 466.  
10 Whitaker, The United States and the Southern Cone, 111 – 112. 
11 Maria Esther Gilio, The Tupamaro Guerrillas, trans. Anne Edmondson (New York: Saturday Morning Press, 
1972), 1. 
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and welfare for the nation. The also state took control of insurance, monopolizing the industry to 
provide workers’ compensation and health insurance.12 Batlle successfully secured social 
stability by redistributing income in a period of economic prosperity, promising social mobility 
and enterprise within Uruguay.13 While this system of socialist democracy allowed Uruguay to 
flourish, it also served as the downfall for the country. 
By 1930, the money was drying up as Uruguay was hit by the Great Depression. Since 
Uruguay could no longer rely on exports to finance the country, the social security system began 
to crumble as it lost funding.14 As a result of the economic hardship, Uruguay fell to dictatorship 
in 1933. The next decade brought a return to democracy under the Colorado Party and economic 
prosperity as Uruguayan exports increased substantially during World War II. However, with 
such a strong focus on exportation, Uruguay was unable to feed its own population.15 Batllismo 
made a resurgence in the 1940s as Uruguay sought to address poverty, poor living and labor 
conditions and economic insecurity.16 As a result, Uruguayans became increasingly dependent 
on the state, which caused immense strain on the nation.  
In 1950, Uruguay was forced to accept loans from the United States through the 
International Monetary Fund. “As a result of US assistance, in terms of loans and ‘economic 
advisement,’ wages were frozen, inflation and unemployment increased and the peso was 
devalued.”17 The Uruguayan government requested more loans, pushing the country further into 
debt. The economy had crumbled until Uruguay was a shadow of what it had once been. The 
                                                          
12 Gilio, The Tupamaro Guerrillas, 1 – 2. 
13 Henry Finch, “Uruguay Since 1930,” in The Cambridge History of Latin America, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 196 – 197. 
14 Ibid, 197 – 199.  
15 Ibid, 257. 
16 Ibid, 203.  
17 Wilson, The Tupamaros, 29. 
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cost of living doubled between 1951 and 1957.18 Inflation quickly rose in the 1950s, reaching 
disastrous numbers through the 1960s. By 1962, inflation had reached forty-nine percent, rising 
to eighty-eight percent in 1965 and finally one hundred thirty-six by 1967.19 In ten years, the 
peso had been devalued from two-fifty to two hundred fifty for one dollar.20 Banks now either 
refused withdrawals, went on strike or closed entirely.21 With the economy in such a disastrous 
state, popular unrest was at its height as Uruguayans watched their quality of life deteriorate. 
Meanwhile, there was a shortage of food subsidies, particularly meat.22 For Uruguayans, the lack 
of meat on the market was a particularly telling example of the dreadful state that they had fallen 
to considering that beef was fundamental to Uruguayan culture and their largest industry. 
Uruguay was in turmoil; the economy had collapsed. 
Public demonstrations became part of daily life in Montevideo in this period, as 
Uruguayans displayed their vexation through protests, strikes and riots. This behavior was 
actively encouraged by Uruguayan Communist Party who sought to radicalize the population.23 
Strikes were so consistent throughout this period that the country could not properly function. In 
fact, newspapers featured an entire section dedicated to “Strikes of the Day.”24 All unions, 
representing all forms of occupations went on strike in the 1960s. “The only people who never 
went on strike [were] the football players.”25 Alongside the striking unions, university students 
protested the plight that they and their country faced. The government responded to the public’s 
                                                          
18 Whitaker, The United States and the Southern Cone, 260. 
19 Wilson, The Tupamaros, 23 – 24. 
20 Ibid, 36. 
21 Pablo Brum, The Robin Hood Guerrillas: The Epic Journey of Uruguay’s Tupamaros, (CreateSpace, 2014), 24 - 
25. 
22 Finch, “Uruguay Since 1930,” 211. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Wilson, The Tupamaros, 36. 
25 Ibid. 
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dissent with force and repression. These are the conditions that molded the Tupamaros and 
inspired them to create a revolution within Uruguay. The small country had reached its time of 
revolution. The people needed to be liberated from the oppression that they endured 
economically, socially and politically. 
The Origin Story 
The revolutionary movement in Uruguay began with a motley group of leftist and 
revolutionary thinkers who loosely joined together in 1962 to discuss Marxist theory and the 
possibility of revolution. What became known as Coordinador represented many different 
factions of leftist thinkers, including socialists, anarchists, communists and others who did not 
identify with the two main parties of Uruguay. Some members hoped to actively ignite a 
revolution, while others preferred legitimate politics, but wanted to prepare for the possibility of 
an authoritarian coup in Uruguay.26 Together, the members of Coordinador trained, discussed 
strategies and shared tips of the revolutionary trade. 
Coordinador was beneficial in aiding the plans and skills of its members. However, since 
Coodinador was a coalition of various political organizations, there were no shared ideologies, 
goals or strategies. This threatened the coalition as a whole, considering the fact that one 
organization’s actions could endanger or compromise another organization or Coordinador as a 
whole. Faced with these issues, some members of Coordinador looked to create an improved 
organization to ignite a revolution in Uruguay. 
Meanwhile, another form of insurgency was taking root in the northwest of Uruguay in a 
town called Bella Unión in the state of Artigas, bordering Brazil and Argentina. There, a group 
of disorganized sugar cane workers were trying to garner better working conditions. In late 1961, 
                                                          
26 Brum, The Robin Hood Guerrillas, 29. 
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they met a man named Raúl Sendic, a Marxist who had studied law at the Universidad de 
República in Montevideo. With the aid of Sendic, the sugar cane workers formed the Unión de 
Trabajadores Azucareros de Artigas (UTAA). Even though they were small and untrained, the 
UTAA became the most militant union in Uruguay, which was remarkable considering that at 
this time, the labor movement in Uruguay was condensed in the city of Montevideo and 
dominated by the Uruguayan Communist Party. Nobody would have thought to go to the rural 
and poverty-stricken parts of Uruguay. 
The UTAA conducted occupations and strikes at sugar cane plantations, many of which 
were owned by American companies. In April of 1962, UTAA marched to the city of 
Montevideo to gain more support for their cause. The march was nearly three hundred seventy-
five miles, about the same distance as marching from Sacramento to Los Angeles. In 
Montevideo, the UTAA were introduced to Coordinador. The relations and alliances they made 
culminated in their first collaboration – together, the UTAA and Coordinador would steal 
weapons from a shooting club to be split between the two organizations. However, they failed in 
their escape and were discovered by the police. They offered Sendic a deal: “If he would 
surrender himself and the rifles, he would receive a fair trial as a political prisoner rather than a 
common criminal.”27 Raúl Sendic refused, making him an outlaw in the north of Uruguay. 
The Beginning of an Era 
A new organization was formed by UTAA and Coordinador’s largest sector, the Socialist 
cell. This group would be more unified than Coordinador and the goal was no longer to plan for 
the revolution but to launch a revolution in Uruguay. They took the name Movimiento de 
Liberación Nacional – Tupamaros, which expressed their desire for the liberation of both 
                                                          
27 Wilson, The Tupamaros, 30. 
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Uruguayans and Latin America as a whole. This ideal was present in their name, since 
“Tupamaros” is derived from Tupac Amaru, the Incan resistance leader in Peru who fought the 
Spaniards in the eighteenth century, and has since been applied to other radical groups, including 
Uruguayan gauchos who rebelled against the Spaniards in the nineteenth century.28 
The Tupamaro’s first operation earned them the title of Robin Hood figures. In December 
of 1963, the Tupamaros ordered a large delivery of Christmas foods, including turkeys and wine 
to be delivered to a poor neighborhood in Montevideo. Ten Tupamaros proceeded to hijack the 
truck and deliver the food to the residents. By 1965, Coordinador had come to an end, leaving 
the Tupamaros to take its place. Like their predecessor, the Tupamaros were willing to include 
anybody, so long as “the goal was natural liberation through armed action.”29 The Tupamaros 
began recruiting, using the slogan “foco o partido” to express their willingness to accept any 
revolutionaries, even communists. In this sense, the Tupamaros came to be the leading 
revolutionary force in Uruguay, considering the fact that they were the only active insurgency. 
The year of 1965 also marked the inauguration of another organization with very 
different goals. The United States launched the Office of Public Safety (OPS) in Uruguay to 
augment police capabilities with advisement, advanced technology and training, which would all 
be funded by the Agency of International Development (AID). The help was necessary; 
Uruguay’s police force had a low morale, considering that they were underpaid, undersupplied, 
undertrained, and underappreciated by the public. From the Americans’ perspective, they 
wouldn’t be any match against the communist threat, which was the main concern of OPS.30 In 
                                                          
28 Gilio, The Tupamaro Guerrillas, i.  
29 Brum, The Robin Hood Guerrillas, 51. 
30 A.J. Langguth, Hidden Terrors: The Truth About U.S. Police Operations in Latin America (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1978), 40. 
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later years, Uruguay would become one of the top funded OPS program in all of Latin America, 
receiving a total of one million three hundred thousand from 1969 to 1971.31  
The problem with OPS and AID was that they were involved in dubious practices. OPS’s 
job was to send officers to the International Police Academy and the School of Americas, where 
police, military and paramilitary officers were trained “in techniques of population control, 
repression, and torture.”32 While torture in Uruguay was rare in the 1960s, it became 
commonplace in 1970. Many prisoners recall the presence of Americans and American 
equipment. The most notable charge against OPS was Daniel Mitrione, the Chief Police Advisor 
in Uruguay, a man who continues to be shrouded in mystery. Many rumors and allegations 
circulate around him, including his involvement with torturing suspects or at minimum, advising 
and teaching torture. However, his story will come later. 
The Tupamaros’ Goals and Strategies 
Uruguay was broken. Oligarchies and foreign exploitation, especially from the United 
States, Brazil and Argentina, had caused a failing economy and rampant corruption. The 
Tupamaros believed that the country could only be restored through the overthrow and seizure of 
the government. However, the leading revolutionary theorists from Cuba had a different opinion 
of Uruguay’s ability to stage a revolution. In 1960, Ernesto “Che” Guevara spoke about 
revolution at the Universidad de la República; in his opinion, Uruguay’s democracy was worth 
preserving. Then in 1964, Régis Debray, a radical French intellectual, spoke with members of 
Coordinador. “Debray insisted that any attempt at urban guerrilla was doomed to fail, and that 
Uruguayan radicals ought to model their revolution on Cuba’s Sierra Maestra foco.”33 In later 
                                                          
31 Wilson, The Tupamaros, 101. 
32 John Stockwell, The Praetorian Guard: The U.S. Role in the New World Order (New York: South End Press, 
1991), 74. 
33 Brum, The Robin Hood Guerrillas, 36. 
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attempts to form an alliance, Cuban leaders suggested that the Tupamaros ally themselves with 
either Argentine revolutionaries or the Uruguayan Communist Party.34 In other words, the 
Tupamaros were on their own. In this manner, they began formulating their own strategies, 
which would be inspired by the Cuban example, but entirely new.  
The Tupamaros hoped to create a foco within Uruguay, using urban guerrilla tactics in a 
Cuban-style offensive to fight against capitalist exploitation and oligarchies, which they saw as 
the source of inequality in Uruguay. When the conditions were right, the Tupamaros would 
commence their revolution and overthrow the government. The Tupamaros’ ultimate goal was 
“the creation of an independent nationalist identity for Uruguayan society and the 
implementation of socialism as a socioeconomic system for the nation.”35 Through nationalism, 
Uruguay would renounce political and economic dependence, while reestablishing a national and 
regional identity. Socialism would provide government nationalizations and allocation of 
resources, as well as a more equal distribution of wealth and income. In this manner, the 
Tupamaros concentrated their revolutionary efforts. 
Much of the Tupamaros’ strategy was based on Che Guevara’s notions of guerrilla 
warfare. However, there would be notable deviations, particularly in location. Guevara wrote, 
“the guerrilla fighter needs to have a good knowledge of the surrounding countryside, the paths 
of entry and escape, the possibilities of speedy maneuver, good hiding places; naturally, also, he 
must count on the support of the people.”36 He notes that mountainous areas or the jungle would 
be ideal. Yet, in Uruguay, the highest peak is no more than two thousand feet above sea level and 
                                                          
34 Brum, The Robin Hood Guerrillas, 62. 
35 The Tupamaros’ definition of a nationalist socialism was completely separate from the Nazi Party and referred 
exclusively to Latin America. Arturo C. Porzecanski, Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1973), 6. 
36 Ernesto “Che” Guevara, “General Principles of Guerrilla Warfare,” In Revolution and Revolutionaries: Guerrilla 
Movements in Latin America, ed. Daniel Castro (Oxford: SR Books, 1999), 68. 
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only three and a half percent of the land is forested. There would be nowhere to hide, for about 
ninety-five percent of Uruguayan land is used for livestock and agriculture.37 The Tupamaros 
would not be able to escape across the borders either, for Brazil and Argentina had fallen to 
authoritarian anti-communist regimes in 1964 and 1966 respectively. Montevideo provided the 
same advantages as a rural setting, as well politicized urban masses to inspire and copious targets 
for their operations. In this manner, the Tupamaros chose Montevideo as their battleground. 
The most important lesson the Tupamaros took from Che Guevara was that “it is not 
necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can create 
them.”38 The Tupamaros took to creating the revolution immediately, following the belief that 
“the very act of arming oneself, preparing, equipping, and pursuing activities that violate 
bourgeois legality, generates revolutionary consciousness, organization and conditions;” in other 
words, revolutionary action precipitates revolutionary situations.39 The Tupamaros focused on 
acquiring funds through bank robberies, stealing weapons from the state and gaining support by 
engaging in armed propaganda. This emphasis on preparation set the Tupamaros apart from most 
other Latin American guerrilla movements. 
“Nobody can deny that an armed group, however small, has more possibility of becoming 
a people’s army than does a group limited to issuing revolutionary positions.”40 Following this 
notion, the Tupamaros avoided publishing lengthy political statements. Instead, “they felt that 
actions were the most important way to create ‘revolutionary consciousness.’ In other words, 
they believed that actions speak louder than words.”41 Thus, the Tupamaros instituted a policy of 
                                                          
37 Wilson, The Tupamaros, 101. 
38 Guevara, “General Principles of Guerrilla Warfare,”66. 
39 Raúl Sendic, “Thirty Questions to a Tupamaro,” In Revolution and Revolutionaries: Guerrilla Movements in Latin 
America, ed. Daniel Castro (Oxford: SR Books, 1999), 154. 
40 Ibid, 155. 
41 Porzecanski, Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla, 1. 
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armed propaganda, meaning that their operations always had a political motivation. The 
Tupamaros’ operations were intended to gain the support of the people by portraying the rampant 
corruption and greed of the government and the elite. By humiliating the authorities and 
portraying their superiority, the Tupamaros would gain the sympathy and admiration of the 
people.42 
Becoming a Tupamaro 
 While the goal of the Tupamaros was to gather the sympathy of the country, the hope was 
that it would lead to tangible support. “Sympathizers were those who, in one way or another, 
aided the Tupamaros by knowingly supplying ‘inside’ information; selling them arms, 
ammunition, chemicals, and other needed raw materials; suggesting potential recruits; and 
assisting in the provision of medical and legal aid.”43 Much of the Tupamaros’ most famous 
operations were based on information or aid from sympathizers and disgruntled employees. 
More active supporters could then make the choice to become part-time Tupamaros who lived 
“legal” lives as peripheral Tupamaros. Sympathizers and peripherals were vital to the 
Tupamaros’ organization; in fact, peripherals did most of the recruiting for the organization. 
 Becoming a Tupamaro was a lengthy process of background searches, character analysis, 
sponsorship and training. Everything would be scrutinized to ensure the quality of the candidate 
and the safety of the organization. Newcomers would be given a false identification and a 
nickname to be used by the rest of their cell. They would first be assigned to a service cell that 
focused on providing necessities for the Tupamaros. “All new guerrillas must participate in some 
form of action. The new guerrilla can only learn how to wage successful guerrilla warfare 
                                                          
42 Brum, The Robin Hood Guerrillas, 85. 
43 Porzecanski, Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla, 33. 
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through active participation.”44 Service work was not considered grunt work for the Tupamaros, 
as it was vital to the functioning of the organization. 
Service cells provided meeting places, intelligence, food, hideouts, safe houses and 
clothing. They also obtained and maintained weapons, built explosives and provided medical 
treatment.45 As a Tupamaro proved their reliability, they would be given the opportunity to 
receive more responsibility. If they chose to, Tupamaros could move from a service cell to a 
combative cell. Combatants were regarded as “the more experienced, reliable, and dedicated 
Tupamaros.”46 They worked full-time and lived clandestinely. Combatants were involved in the 
organization’s operations, including sabotage, reprisals, robberies and other illegal acts. 
 The Tupamaros were a diverse group, representing different demographics, backgrounds 
and occupations. As is true of most revolutionary groups, the Tupamaros were generally in their 
twenties. However, the Tupamaros boasted members as young as eighteen and as old as sixty.47 
Women accounted for roughly thirty-nine percent of the organization and were involved in every 
form of revolutionary work.48 Due to Uruguayan socialism, most Tupamaros were educated and 
of the middle class.49 However, this certainly didn’t account for all Tupamaros. The organization 
was very inclusive “from semiliterate peasants to distinguished intellectuals and professionals; 
from unemployed and similarly isolated individuals to the relatives of the highest government 
officials; from students in their late teens to mothers of over fifty.”50 Tupamaros and their 
supporters were everywhere, in all branches of society, providing intelligence and expertise. 
                                                          
44 Wilson, The Tupamaros, 79. 
45 Porzecanski, Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla, 32. 
46 Ibid, 33. 
47 Arturo Porzecanski collected data on the Tupamaros’ demographics based on information of captured Tupamaros. 
Ibid, 30. 
48 Brum, The Robin Hood Guerrillas, 49. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Porzecanski, Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla, 28. 
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They were impossible to pinpoint, for anybody could be a Tupamaro, even police officers or 
government officials. This was the Tupamaros’ advantage, making them incredibly successful in 
their activities.  
 The Tupamaros’ organization began with a single cell consisting of two to six members. 
Cell members did not know the identities of other members and only referred to each other with 
nicknames (for example, Raúl Sendic was known as “el Bebé”). Any unnecessary information 
was avoided for the protection of the organization as a whole. Only the cell leader, appointed by 
an executive committee would know how to contact other members of their cell. Each cell either 
engaged in service work or combatant work. Both were expected to gather intelligence to inform 
the next operations for their cell or the organization as a whole.  
Multiple cells made up a column, which might be grouped according to location or type 
of work (for example, the medical column). Columns were “administrative entities put together 
to facilitate and coordinate the action of individual cells;” they had no hierarchy or leaders.51 
They were independent entities, intended to merely divide labor within the Tupamaros. “Each 
column was designed to be self-sustaining in the case of trouble at the top; thus the columns 
were equipped to gather intelligence, maintain supplies, and undertake armed or propaganda 
action independently, making it theoretically possible for one surviving column to regenerate the 
movement.”52 Columns provided the advantage of familiarity since members were accustomed to 
the locale and residents of the area, making them more effective in their operations. However, 
within a columns and its cells, secrecy and anonymity was essential. Generally, Tupamaros only 
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knew members within their cell and were unaware of other members of their column for cells 
maintained minimal contact with one another.  
Together, the various cells and columns worked to further the Tupamaros’ mission of 
preparing for the revolution. Their strategy for the present and future was “to form an armed 
force with the greatest possible speed, with the capacity to take advantage of any propitious 
conjuncture created by the crisis or other factors. To create an awareness in the population, 
through actions of the armed group or other means, that without revolution there will be no 
change.”53 Thus, the Tupamaros began preparing for the revolution through a series of operations 
meant to garner support, funds and supplies. In the following years, the Tupamaros would rob 
banks, steal weapons and explosives and bomb symbols of their enemies. Through these 
operations, the Tupamaros were gaining reputation and experience as they moved towards their 
most prolific period. 
Strange Forces Working in Uruguay 
The conditions of Uruguay took a turn on December 6th, 1967, when the Uruguayan 
president died shortly after he was elected; he was replaced with Vice President Jorge Pacheco 
Areco. The newly inaugurated president “wasted no time in forming the image of himself that he 
wanted to create: that of the ‘strong man.’”54 Immediately, President Pacheco worked to rid the 
country of lawlessness and subversion. In 1967, he banned popular leftist newspapers, as well as 
the Socialist Party and the Communist Party, both of which were well-established political 
parties in Uruguay, formed in 1910 and 1920 respectively. This was the first time a party or the 
press had been banned in Uruguay, considering that there was such a strong democratic history 
within the country. President Pacheco also requested American assistance to defeat the 
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Tupamaros. With official approval, more CIA officers were dispatched to Uruguay, while the 
first nine police and military officers were sent to the School of Americas to be trained that 
year.55 
President Pacheco continued his onslaught in 1968 when he invoked emergency powers 
in June in response to strikes and protests addressing the country’s rising inflation and cost of 
living. Using Article 168 of the Constitution, Pacheco froze prices and wages, closed labor 
unions, banned public meetings, established limited censorship and jailed political agitators. By 
the end of the month, martial law was declared, which placed newspapers under official 
censorship.56 However, the emergency powers did nothing to stop the rising inflation or the 
strikes and protests that persisted throughout the city. 
 In one of their leaflets distributed to the public, the Tupamaros described the state of 
Uruguay in the late 1960’s: 
There is no freedom of opinion. Newspapers, radio programmes and political parties are 
suppressed, Parliament is helpless. Hundreds of detainees fill the prisons and the military 
barracks. Men are dismissed in great numbers from their jobs by government decree, 
causing hundreds of families to be thrown on the bread line. The unions and the right to 
strike have been trampled underfoot. Torture and beatings are inflicted with complicity of 
the Judiciary. People are tried and imprisoned without proof of guilt. The incomes of the 
great majority are frozen whilst an increase in affluence of a small minority is 
encouraged. Corruption is rampant in the Government.57 
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Considering the climate of Uruguay, the Tupamaros strengthened their preparations for the 
coming offensive. In 1968, eighteen members underwent training in Cuba.58 Meanwhile, the 
Tupamaros continued robbing banks and stealing arms and explosives. In the year of 1968, the 
Tupamaros successfully held up five banks and one casino, stealing about twenty-six million 
pesos or over six million dollars today.59 However, the Tupamaros were moving to bigger and 
better things. “By 1968, the Tupamaros escalated their pressure, moving from ‘Robin Hood’ 
stage of self-publicity and exposing the regime to a more aggressive phase of direct challenges to 
government authority.”60 The Tupamaros had moved to the next stage of the revolution. 
On August 7th, 1968, the Tupamaros commenced Operación Pajarito to force President 
Pacheco to support strikers’ demands. Four Tupamaros kidnapped Ulysses Pereira Reverbel, the 
infamous strikebreaker and president of UTE, a power and telecommunications company. He 
was a close friend and political ally of President Pacheco and also held the title of the most hated 
man in all of Uruguay. He was released after five days once President Pacheco agreed to the 
strikers’ demands. The Tupamaros threatened that the future safety of public officials would 
depend “on the behavior of the repressive forces and the fascist groups at service.”61 Operación 
Pajarito marked the beginning of people’s support of the Tupamaros. In fact, poor Uruguayans 
would joke, “Attention, Tupamaros, kidnap me,” since Pereira was several pounds heavier when 
he was released.62 
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In early 1969, the Tupamaros began their most important attack yet. The Tupamaros had 
received intelligence from an employee at Monty’s, an investment bank that had been involved 
in illegal dealings in foreign currency for several clients. The robbery went smoothly; the 
Tupamaros found Monty’s accounting ledgers which revealed its illegal business. After the 
robbery on February 15th, the Tupamaros themselves notified both the police and the press of 
their crime, before they provided the state prosecutor with the ledgers and their analysis of the 
bank’s crimes. “The press releases exposed tax evasion, massive fraud and corruption reaching 
to the highest levels of the government…that had the full blessing of the United States.”63 As a 
result of the investigation, several businessmen and politicians were arrested for illegal dealings, 
revealing rampant the corruption at the highest spheres of power. 
The Tupamaros had just garnered the support of the working class, while portraying the 
failings of the government. As one man explained: 
I saw when Monty’s was held up. Who were the real villains, I’d like to know? Those 
who went in with a machine-gun or those inside lining their pockets? The Tupamaros 
don’t frighten me. What’s more if they are Communists that doesn’t scare me either. You 
know what does scare me? Those people who go and play roulette and gamble three or 
four million.64 
  
The Tupamaros followed the success at Monty four days later by robbing the San Rafael Casino 
in Punta del Este, a resort town for Uruguay’s elite. Two Tupamaros dressed as policemen 
informed the manager that he would need to accompany them to San Rafael, as it had just been 
robbed. The Tupamaros then used the manager’s keys to empty the casino’s entire vault, which 
amounted to over fifty million pesos or about twelve million dollars today. However, upon 
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learning that the Tupamaros had also stolen the casino workers’ paychecks and tips, Sendic 
offered to return the money, stating that the Tupamaros would only steal from the oligarchies.65  
During these operations, the government was working to fight the lawlessness in 
Uruguay. However, the source of their problems was not the Tupamaros, but the persistent 
strikes and protests that were crippling Montevideo. On June 24th of 1969, the government 
initiated a limited state of siege in response to major demonstrations in Montevideo. “It was, of 
course, a one-sided battle; on the one side, the police were armed with tear gas and newly-
imported American guns, and on the other side, students were armed with stones, marbles and 
pent-up frustrations.”66 The Tupamaros were not the government’s concern, for their operations 
were considered “police matters.” With little resistance from the state, the Tupamaros continued 
their campaign. 
Then in October, the Tupamaros initiated their greatest operation yet to commemorate the 
anniversary of Che Guevara’s death in Bolivia. The Tupamaros would take control of Pando, a 
small city outside of Montevideo as a show of strength to both the public and the state. The 
Tupamaros would arrive under the guise of a funerary procession with six hearses and a 
procession of mourners. Roughly twenty Tupamaros marched solemnly into the city carrying the 
coffin of the “deceased,” which hid the Tupamaros weapons.67 Other Tupamaros joined the 
procession along the march or met their comrades in Pando, coming by bus with their weapons 
hidden amongst normal possessions such as briefcases or fishing poles. Altogether, the force in 
Pando was roughly fifty strong. They were distinguished by white handkerchiefs tied around 
their arms. 
                                                          
65 Brum, The Robin Hood Guerrillas, 89. 
66 Wilson, The Tupamaros, 40. 
67 Gilio, The Tupamaro Guerrillas, 103 – 104.  
23 
The Tupamaros arrived into the city at roughly noon; the operation began at one o’clock. 
The Tupamaros had six targets in Pando. They intended to rob three banks and subdue the police 
station, the fire station and cut communications off so the city wouldn’t receive reinforcements 
from Montevideo, which was less than an hour away. The operation began with the police 
station, which was occupied with disguised Tupamaros. A police officer recounted, “I found 
myself looking into their guns. They were telling me to put my hands up. I laughed because I 
thought it must be a joke, but I saw several chaps in Air Force uniforms, one with a sub-
machine-gun, and heard one of them say ‘Hands up! You’re all covered.’”68 The Tupamaros 
proceeded to force the police officers present into the jail cells.69 Meanwhile, another team of 
Tupamaros subdued the fire station, where “five or six men were having a siesta. When they saw 
us come in armed they remained paralyzed on their beds, more I think from the sheer surprise 
than from fear.”70 Another team cut the communication lines to prevent anybody reporting the 
situation to Montevideo. Three other teams worked to rob the banks, taking forty million pesos 
or nearly ten million dollars, while other Tupamaros discussed their politics and handed out 
leaflets. 
Things went relatively smoothly and the Tupamaros met no resistance; all six operations 
took roughly fifteen minutes, but problems arose during their escape. Pando was in chaos as 
“more and more people, anxious not to miss anything, crowded the pavements, stood on 
doorsteps, hung over balconies…We needed the streets to be clear, not packed with inquisitive 
spectators who would get in the way of our retreat.”71 Some Tupamaros attempted to herd 
civilians and direct traffic to aid their escape, but the streets were too chaotic. In their escape, the 
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Tupamaros were fragmented. “We lost our identity as a group. We got into several different cars. 
We didn’t know anybody.”72 Most of the Tupamaros made it to the rendezvous at the graveyard, 
but some were left behind and quickly apprehended. One car had to be abandoned, as it had been 
destroyed from a shootout with a lone police officer. After a short regrouping, the Tupamaros 
continued on their way to Montevideo. 
 By now, the National Police had learned of the attack on Pando. A police patrol met the 
Tupamaros at the city boundary of Montevideo, but the Tupamaros were being driven by official 
uniformed chauffeurs with Tupamaros dressed as police officers, allowing them to pass through 
the police barrier without incident. Afterwards, the Tupamaros split into two groups. Those that 
took a more roundabout route made it safely to the city, while those that took the direct route met 
the elite combat force of Metropolitan and Republican Guards. On the outskirts of Montevideo’s 
suburbs, behind a sharp bend, patrol cars blocked the road. Some Tupamaros stayed to fight, 
engaging in a shootout with police. Others ran into the surrounding fields. However, the police 
had the advantage of helicopters, armored cars, army trucks and patrol cars. The police cordoned 
the area, taking out Tupamaros one by one. “They arrested a lot of people who were completely 
innocent and had nothing to do with the taking of Pando, and they treated them just the same. 
Beating and pushing them around until they got to the prison van and then more beatings to get 
them to get in.”73 In total, sixteen Tupamaros were captured and three were shot dead. In the 
following weeks, the police used the networks of the captured Tupamaros to arrest others.74  
This show of violence was unusual in Uruguay, making Pando a shocking and frightening 
event to the average Uruguayan. Initially, many police officers and leading officials, including 
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OPS officers, viewed the events of Pando as a success; some even believed that Pando would be 
the downfall of the Tupamaros.75 However, the operation in Pando was a brilliant display of the 
Tupamaro’s wit and strength, despite its unfortunate end. The Tupamaros had successfully made 
themselves known, especially when considered alongside the Monty scandal and the San Rafael 
robbery. The government soon recognized the Tupamaros’ effect on the Uruguayan public. “The 
demonstration of guerrilla power [at Pando] was a sobering challenge to governmental 
authority.”76 The government reacted by imposing further censorship, banning the terms, “cell, 
commandos, extremists, terrorists, subversive, political delinquent or ideological delinquent.”77 
However, the damage was already done. The Tupamaros were gaining admiration and support 
from Uruguayans.  
The Tupamaros continued their assault. They were so prolific that it seemed as if every 
day, the Uruguayans were shocked by a new operation. By the end of 1969, the Tupamaros had 
executed over one hundred operations, seventy-seven of which they considered successful.78 
Their operations were having a strong effect. The Tupamaros had garnered a sizeable sum of 
money and new weapons, along with a number of safe houses throughout Montevideo. By 1969, 
the Tupamaros were roughly one thousand strong with a substantial support network that seemed 
to grow exponentially.79As one Tupamara recalled, “It seemed like the flame of the revolution 
was lighting up Uruguayan society, judging by the number of volunteers knocking on the doors 
of the organization.”80 The Tupamaros even boasted supporters within the government, military, 
police, and large corporations. They also had access to medical clinics with surgery and 
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ambulance capabilities, therapy services and plastic surgery services.81 Altogether, it was their 
most prosperous year. 
The Tupamaros boasted the highest acceptance rate of any American insurgency 
operating at the time.82 In this manner, the Tupamaros were becoming both an enemy and a 
threat to the Uruguayan state. More importantly, the Tupamaros were becoming a potential 
alternative to the state.  
We too can imprison those responsible for this situation such as Gaetano Pellegrini. We 
raid the homes of the compliant politicians just as they raid the workers’ homes. We 
snatch the arms we need from the enemy. We do not turn to foreigners to ask them to 
finance the revolution. We take the funds we need to mount the revolutionary apparatus 
from the enemy. Although they try to muzzle us our voice will continue to be heard.83 
  
As the Tupamaros engaged in more operations, garnering support from various demographics, 
including those in power, the Tupamaros could be seen as a “parallel government” or a “shadow 
government” by forcing Uruguayans to choose a side – the Tupamaros or the Uruguayan state.84 
It had become clear that there would soon be a power struggle between the two adversaries in the 
ideological war for the country. 
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Plan Satán: The Fall from Grace 
  
 With significant support from the masses, the Tupamaros felt they were ready to stage an 
uprising. They intended to demoralize and discredit the armed forces and police, as well as 
destroy forces of government coercion. By 1969, the Tupamaros had moved to a more aggressive 
stage of the revolution. “Years of intense preparatory work went by before the guerrillas 
launched full-scale war on the government.”85 In the new year, the Tupamaros would begin their 
brutal offensive. 
The Tupamaros began the year with a campaign to humiliate and discredit the state. They 
began with Línea Hostigamiento, a group dedicated to harassing the police. Tupamaros would 
disarm police officers on the street or even in their homes to prove that they had the information 
to strike at any time and any place.86 Then, on March 8th, the Tupamaros initiated Operación 
Paloma, freeing thirty-eight Tupamaras from prison on International Women’s Day. It was a 
great embarrassment for the government, considering that the women were only guarded by 
nuns.87 Then, a naval cadet provided enough information for the Tupamaros to lead an assault on 
the national naval training center. Late at night, about twenty Tupamaros disguised as navy 
officers entered the premises, forcing the navy cadets out of bed. The Tupamaros made off with 
over seven hundred weapons, many of which were military grade American weapons, as well as 
a plethora of ammunition to go along with them. The Tupamaros now had an arsenal at their 
disposal, including machine guns, semi-automatic rifles, handguns and grenade launchers.88 
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Their campaign to demoralize and demean the police was taking effect, but with adverse 
consequences, as the police became more dedicated in their fight against the Tupamaros. The 
police had developed a new tactic that was proving extremely effective: the ratonera. Once the 
police discovered a Tupamaro safe house, they would wait and arrest the members that returned, 
just like a mousetrap. The Tupamaros also upped their ante with a series of cop killings. Some 
had been accidents, while others were targeted assassinations. The police sought retribution for 
the attacks against their own, leading to more aggressive interrogation styles, while the 
Tupamaros retaliated against officers suspected of torturing detainees. 
In Uruguay, torture was rare before 1970. Yet prisoner abuse was not unheard of, 
especially amongst the Metropolitan Guard, an elite paramilitary police squad.89 The torture was 
unsophisticated but brutal. 
We had to run the gauntlet, except that we couldn’t run. They made us go dreadfully 
slowly, and all the while we were being kicked and punched and beaten. The men 
shouted insults at us and some howled like wolves. I felt I was going through a tunnel and 
that I’d die before I got to the end. Everybody tried to get in as many blows as possible, 
never mind where they landed.90 
  
At times, other techniques were used. “They kept pushing my head under and pulling it out 
again. Each time I swallowed more water. Finally I couldn’t hear what they were asking. Then 
they took me out and started to burn my arms with cigarettes.”91 Police also administered electric 
shocks during interrogations, but the equipment was outdated. The police’s methods were 
rudimentary in comparison to the torture that would later be implemented by the military. 
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Reports of torture within the police became common knowledge, leading to public 
outcry. The Senate conducted a six month investigation into the matter with disturbing results. 
“The use of torture by Montevideo’s police had become “habitual,” “frequent,” and even 
“normal”; that it was being applied to innocent people, nonpolitical prisoners, women, students, 
and labor leaders; and that torture had become a routine application of electric shock, beatings, 
burns, starvation, and other cruel interrogation methods.”92 As a result of this study, the Senate 
and House of Representatives voted to lift Pacheco’s security measures in July of 1970. 
However, President Pacheco quickly reinstated them, allowing the continued assault against 
Uruguay’s subversives.  
Plan Satán 
With an exceeding number of Tupamaros being held in the Punta Carretas prison, the 
Tupamaros decided it was time to take action; they would commit a series of political 
kidnappings and ransom the hostages in exchange for the release of their comrades. The 
Tupamaros took their inspiration from their Brazilian counterparts, the Movimento 
Revolucionário 8 de Outubro (MR-8), who had kidnapped American Ambassador Charles Burke 
Elbrick in exchange for the release of fifteen prisoners in 1969.93 The Tupamaros had already 
proven their capability with the kidnapping of Gaetano Pellegrini Gimpieto in 1969, who was 
held from late September through November. Now they planned to up the ante with the 
commencement of Plan Satán, which expanded the idea of a political kidnapping into a full 
campaign. They planned to kidnap multiple victims, both native and foreign. The victims had to 
be both important and influential to demand a strong response from the government, while also 
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being morally suspect so the kidnappings would inspire solidarity from the average Uruguayan. 
Diplomats were preferable, considering that the kidnapping would lead to international pressure 
on the Uruguayan government. 
In this manner, the Tupamaros chose their victims. Native victims chosen included Judge 
Daniel Pereira Manelli, who sentenced Tupamaros; Julio Cesar Mamelli, a union official and 
Walter Pintos Risso, the Minister of Works. The foreigners chosen were Dan Mitrione, the Chief 
Public Safety Advisor of the American Embassy; Aloysio Mares Dias Gomide, the Brazilian 
Consul; Gordon Jones, the US Embassy’s Second Secretary and British Ambassador Geoffrey 
Jackson. It’s notable that the countries represented were only the United States, Brazil and the 
United Kingdom; the Tupamaros considered these countries to be the most heinous. All were 
condemned for their interference in Uruguay, which Tupamaros saw as the plight of their 
country for “although officially Uruguay has existed as an independent nation for almost 150 
years, politically, militarily, economically and even culturally, Uruguay depends heavily on the 
axes Brazil-Argentina and Great Britain-United States.”94 The Tupamaros also expected that 
these nations would have the most influence on the Uruguayan government and would pressure 
its leaders tenaciously, which would work in the Tupamaros’ favor.  
For their safe return, the Tupamaros demanded the release of all of their imprisoned or 
detained comrades, which amounted to one hundred fifty, “the largest prisoner ransom ever 
demanded for kidnapped diplomats.”95 The Tupamaros expected that between the three nations’ 
demands, the Uruguayan government would be pressured enough that they would be forced to 
succumb to the Tupamaros’ demands or would collapse entirely. This internal and external 
pressure would work in the Tupamaros’ favor to weaken the government. “The Tupamaros 
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sought to provoke a ministerial crisis and foreign intervention, to lead ultimately to the downfall 
of the Uruguayan government.”96 
By their calculation, there were three courses of events for Plan Satán. The first was that 
the President would concede with their demands and release the Tupamaros. Yet considering the 
fact that the executive branch had no jurisdiction over prisoners held by the judicial branch, this 
would effectively be a move towards a dictatorial state, strengthening the Tupamaros’ position in 
Uruguay as the government’s image faltered both nationally and internationally. Another 
possibility was that faced with increasing pressure, the President would resign, leading to either a 
weaker leader or one more favorable to the Tupamaros.97 Finally, the Tupamaros considered the 
possibility of a foreign intervention, especially by Brazil or Argentina, which would inspire 
Uruguayans throughout the country to rise against the invaders in “a mass revolution.”98 The 
Tupamaros believed that in the event of any, the Uruguayan government would be weakened and 
discredited, while the Tupamaros would triumph, either in popular support, image or numbers. 
Their goals for the campaign showed the scope of Plan Satán and their intentions as the 
revolution reached its climax. 
Everything was in place for the kidnappings. The Tupamaros had learned a lot during the 
kidnapping of Ulises Pereira Reverbel in 1968 and the kidnapping of Gaetano Pellegrini 
Gimpieto the following year, when the Italian was held for over a month in what became known 
as “the People’s Court.” Now the Tupamaros were preparing to initiate their most ambitious plan 
yet. The campaign started on July 28th, 1970 with the kidnapping of the criminal-courts judge, 
Daniel Pereira Manelli.  On the same day, the Tupamaros also attempted to kidnap a union 
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official named Julio Cesar Mamelli, but he fired his pistol, scaring away his kidnappers.99 While 
Mamelli’s kidnapping was a failure, they successfully abducted Judge Daniel Pereira Manelli 
from his home. In typical Tupamaro fashion, his kidnappers made sure to assure his wife that 
they only wanted to “have a lengthy talk” and that he would be released within forty-eight hours. 
Daniel Pereira Manelli was chosen as a victim of Plan Satán for “his alleged cover-up for police 
brutality and prejudice against the Tupamaros” according to communiques published by the 
Tupamaros.100 However, the Tupamaros soon decided he would be held longer for further 
interrogation regarding detention and trial procedures. Meanwhile, rumors started circulating that 
in exchange for the release of the judge, the Tupamaros would demand the release of prisoners. 
Shortly afterwards, the Tupamaros captured their next victims.  
On the morning of July 31st, the Tupamaros made their next move with the kidnapping of 
the Brazilian consul, Aloysio Mares Dias Gomide from his home in the Carrasco neighborhood 
of Montevideo. The Tupamaros gained entry by presenting themselves as repairmen from a light 
and power company, there to repair Dias’ telephone, which had been broken for the last day.101 
About nine Tupamaros entered the house with weapons drawn, leading to Dias surrendering 
himself as his wife and children watched on.102 Dias was taken in his own car, which was later 
abandoned when the Tupamaros switched vehicles to drive Dias to the People’s Court.103 
Meanwhile, an unsuccessful kidnapping attempt was made against the Uruguayan Minister of 
Public Works, Walter Pintos Risso, as he left his apartment building. However, there is 
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speculation that the Tupamaros’ real target was an Uruguayan Army officer that lived in the 
same building and reportedly resembled Pintos.104 
In the neighborhood of Pocitos, Montevideo, another cell targeted an apartment building 
that was home to two American diplomats, Gordon Jones and Nathan Rosenfeld. That morning 
when Nathan Rosenfeld, the United States Cultural Attaché, went downstairs to the garage, he 
was met with two young Tupamaros who mistook him for their intended target, Gordon Jones, 
the Second Secretary and Economic Officer. Realizing that Rosenberg was too old to be their 
target, the Tupamaros hit him over the head to knock him out, but failed to check if he was still 
conscious. When Gordon Jones arrived and spotted his friend, he rushed to Rosenfeld’s side, 
who he presumed to be dead, when he was jumped by the Tupamaros. The two young men then 
proceeded to tie up Jones and roll him up in blankets before lying his body in the bed of a pickup 
truck, leaving Rosenfeld in the garage. As they were driving away, Jones managed to roll out of 
the truck at a stoplight while screaming for help; the Tupamaros drove away without him.105 
What would become the most consequential abduction of Plan Satán was the kidnapping 
of Daniel Anthony Mitrione, the Chief Public Safety Adviser in the American Embassy. Dan 
Mitrione was a particularly coveted victim of the Tupamaros, considering the rumors of torture 
that surrounded him. On the same morning as the other kidnappings, at about 8:15 a.m., Dan 
Mitrione was being picked up at his home in Malvín by his driver, a police sergeant named 
González. While Mitrione had been “warned to take security precautions,” he was not armed; 
González, however, was armed with a .38 caliber revolver.106 The car was heading towards the 
rambla, but had only gone about a block and a half when their car was cut off by a pickup truck. 
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Four or five men exited the two stolen trucks and worked to abduct Mitrione. “While one man 
quickly covered the police driver, the others forced Mitrione into the second pickup truck, 
cursing, beating, and accidentally shooting him near the shoulder in the process.”107 The whole 
event apparently happened so quickly that eyewitnesses couldn’t offer police investigators a 
description of any of the kidnappers.108 
Early Responses to the Kidnappings 
Much of my knowledge of the kidnapping comes from a study of the Mitrione 
Kidnapping, organized by the RAND Corporation for the Department of State and the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The study was completed in 1977, but was not 
released to the public until 1987. The other sources I have used are files from the Department of 
State, many of which have only been declassified in 2005 and published by the National Security 
Archives under the Freedom of Information Act. With this in mind, I will recount the response to 
the kidnapping of Dan Mitrione. 
The authorities were immediately made aware of the kidnappings and attempts. Sergeant 
González had called the police headquarters shortly after Mitrione was taken, while Rosenberg 
and Jones reported the attempted kidnappings directly to the US embassy.109 Police 
investigations began immediately. The Uruguayan government “immediately responded by 
branding the kidnappings as ‘police matters,’ despite the international weight of the kidnapping 
campaign.110 Initial reports from the US embassy suggested that the kidnappings were made by 
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“terrorists, presumably MLN or FARO.”111  Sweeping searches and roadblocks were 
immediately set up by the police, but were ineffective, considering the lack of manpower. For 
this reason, police officers were brought in from the interior and several military units were 
incorporated into the police force to aid in the effort, but a lack of coordination was hampering 
the efficiency of the joint search.112 
By 1:15 p.m. on July 31st, the kidnappings were announced to the public on the radio.113 
Then, in the late afternoon, the Tupamaros issued their first communique regarding the fresh 
batch of kidnappings. Communique #3 described Mitrione’s condition and the treatment he was 
receiving for his gunshot wound. While early reports had suggested that they would only request 
a ransom of several prisoners, Communique #3 clarified that the Tupamaros would demand “the 
liberation of all ‘political prisoners’ then being held by the police, in exchange for Mitrione and 
Dias Gomide.”114 They also included Mitrione’s personal card and described two of his personal 
effects as proof of the communique’s authenticity.115 
Shortly after receiving the communique, Ambassador Charles Adair began regular 
meetings with Foreign Minister Peirano Facio. The Foreign Minister expressed the Uruguayan 
government’s doubt of the authenticity of the note, which led to the decision to wait for further 
word from the Tupamaros. Moreover, the Uruguayan government was reluctant to respond to the 
Tupamaros due to their confusion over the Tupamaros’ message. Communique #3 did not 
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demand a specific ransom and the Uruguayan government “did not believe that it could respond 
until it knew what it was responding to.”116 The Uruguayan response was worrying to 
Ambassador Adair, who thought that this tactic could waste time and lead to a stalemate in 
communication. However, the Uruguayan government was in a precarious situation. On the one 
hand, their actions would directly affect the treatment and fate of the kidnapping victims. If 
things went sour and it was believed that the Uruguayan government had made an error in 
judgement, Uruguay could face a poor international image and a deterioration in diplomatic 
relations with the United States or Brazil. For this reason, the Uruguayan government chose to 
wait until they had more information through police investigation and the Tupamaros’ 
communiques. 
Meanwhile, the three remaining Public Safety Division officers worked to advise the 
police, improving the police’s efficiency. “During the first twenty-four hours, Uruguayan police 
detained numerous suspects, while police and military checkpoints throughout Montevideo and 
its environs halted and examined tens of thousands of vehicles and pedestrians.”117 More than 
fifty were arrested in that time, including a Tupamaro who participated in the Mitrione 
kidnapping.118 The police also discovered the stolen vehicles that had been used in the 
kidnappings.119 
By August 2nd, the two requested Office of Public Safety agents arrived from 
Washington. With the help of the OPS officers, police operations were strengthened, now aided 
by the Army, Air Force, Navy and fire departments, amounting to a force of several thousand.120 
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The police led “broad, sweeping searches of entire areas, sealing them off beforehand, then 
checking house-to-house.”121 Over one thousand raids were conducted in a single day, as police 
searched the homes of ordinary citizens in search of the kidnapping victims.122 Medical clinics 
received great attention, considering Mitrione’s gunshot wound.123 They also continued to check 
everybody leaving the city of Montevideo, as well as those leaving the country by air, water or 
car. Meanwhile, the Tupamaros were conducting operations as if nothing was out of the 
ordinary, including two bank robberies. The Tupamaros imprisoned at the Puntas Carretas prison 
also reinstituted drills and training in the prison’s courtyard in preparation for their liberation and 
renewed campaign.124 
At 3:30 p.m. on August 2nd, the Tupamaros issued their next communique. Communique 
#4 assured that the prisoners were in good health and Mitrione was recovering well from his 
gunshot wound, likely in response to the United States’ effort to make a humanitarian plea for 
the release of Mitrione. The Tupamaros then demanded the release of “all prisoners judged or 
condemned for political crimes anywhere in the country, except those individuals who chose to 
stay and serve their sentence.”125 All freed prisoners were to be sent to Mexico, Peru or Algeria. 
However, no deadline was set and no consequences were stated should their demands be 
ignored.126 
The next morning, Ambassador Adair met with President Pacheco. Now that the 
Tupamaros had demanded a specific ransom, Adair sought to determine what the Uruguayan 
government’s course of action would be. However,  
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The President observed that the MLN messages had not been directed to any state 
institution or office, but rather were aimed at Uruguayan society as a whole. Thus the 
demands amounted to a blackmail effort against the entire Uruguayan nation. Moreover, 
the demands were so unreasonable that the MLN appeared to be deliberately seeking the 
impossible.127 
  
The President resolved to have “a concrete and direct communique [from the Tupamaros] before 
revealing their hand” and were unwilling to make concessions or negotiate with terrorists.128 
Despite this seeming lack of response, President Pacheco sent a message to President Nixon the 
same day, vowing to use “all means at our disposal to secure Mitrione’s liberation.”129 The 
Uruguayan government expected to respond in the next forty-eight hours, as President Pacheco 
believed that the Tupamaros would soon issue another note with more reasonable requests.130  
Until then the Uruguayan government would stand resolute in its stance. 
Following this line of thinking, the President asked General Antonio Francese, the 
Minister of Interior, to address the public. On August 3rd, at noon, the Ministry of Interior 
published its communique, which questioned the legitimacy of the Tupamaros and rejected their 
demands altogether. The communique stated that the police would continue their efforts to 
recover the kidnapped victims, despite the danger and causalities they faced “defending society 
against delinquency.”131 They also reaffirmed their rejection of the Tupamaros’ legitimacy, 
stating that the term “political prisoners” did not apply to the more than one hundred Tupamaros 
imprisoned, for the Tupamaros were merely “common criminals,” as opposed to a political 
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force.132 Finally, the communique frankly informed the Uruguayan public that “there was no 
guarantee that the kidnappers would subsequently halt their activities, let alone repent and return 
stolen arms,” noting that the Tupamaros had made no sign of conciliation.133 The government’s 
communique sent a strong message to the public and the Tupamaros, garnering a strong response 
from each in the coming days. 
The following day, the Tupamaros released Judge Daniel Pereira from the People’s 
Prison at 9:30 p.m. along with a new communique, rejecting the Ministry of the Interior’s 
statement altogether. Communique #5 stated that the Tupamaros had stayed true to their word, 
releasing Pereira as promised (although a few days late), despite his crimes: “incorrect 
processing of captured Tupamaros, malfeasance, the holding of arrested Tupamaros for more 
than 48 hours without due process, and torture.”134 This act of good faith reassured the 
government that the Tupamaros would release their prisoners after having sufficiently 
interrogated their victims and published the damning confessions. Also, police captured four 
relatively notable Tupamaros that day. For a short period, it seemed like things were looking up. 
Uruguay’s Divided Opinions 
The government’s response was becoming increasingly fragmented. The police 
represented the face of Uruguay’s response to the Tupamaro kidnappings and they continued to 
conduct quasi-legal raids on the public in hope of securing the kidnapped victims. The President 
maintained his support of the police force, reasserting that the whole thing was “police matters.” 
Legally, he could not capitulate to the Tupamaros’ demands for the release of over one hundred 
prisoners under the Uruguayan Constitution. Moreover, President Pacheco stubbornly 
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maintained a strong stance against any form of negotiation with the criminals, even if that meant 
communicating with them. The military strongly supported this position, as they opposed any 
concessions and did not want the government to show any “hint of weakness or willingness to 
capitulate.”135 
Much of the hardline policies of the Executive Branch and the military stemmed from 
their vow to respect the Uruguayan Constitution and maintain democratic principles.  
Uruguayans in general had placed a high value on their country’s historic image and 
performance as one of Latin America’s successful liberal democracies. They had enjoyed 
a long tradition of stable civilian rule alongside an essentially apolitical military, in a 
continent where military dictatorships had flourished on all sides for many years. In 
addition, Uruguayan leaders took great care to abide by the constitutional and legal 
precepts for institutional behavior.136 
  
Moreover, the President could not legally free the Tupamaros demanded for the ransom. “The 
Judicial branch held jurisdiction over most of the imprisoned MLN members, and any unilateral 
move by the Executive branch to release them would be considered dictatorial by both the 
Judicial and Legislative branches.”137 
Constitutionally, the President had no right to release the prisoners and the Judicial 
Branch had already privately agreed to reject any notion of freeing the prisoners for the 
aforementioned rationale. While, the president did have the authority to pardon the prisoners 
under Uruguayan law, President Pacheco was too stubborn to consider it.138 The President’s 
strong message was a reassurance to his own government, the public and the international 
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community that Uruguay would remain democratic and would not fall into dictatorial means. For 
this reason, the President remained distant from the kidnappings. 
 The Foreign Minister and Vice President supported a more lenient approach and 
advocated for negotiations or at minimum, communications with the Tupamaros, which of 
course would not threaten legality under the Constitution. This method was supported by 
Ambassador. Numerous avenues were taken to attempt to communicate with the Tupamaros 
outside of communiques. The Foreign Minister reportedly met privately with lawyers who had 
defended the Tupamaros in hope of opening a line of communication on August 5th and 6th, 
which was likely supported by the President, despite his firm public stance.139 
Alternatives to the Tupamaros’ demands were also being considered at this time, 
including amnesty, exile or deportation. While the Executive Branch focused on police 
operations and the Judicial Branch opposed a prisoner release, some members of the Legislative 
Branch increasingly supported “negotiations or some formula that might lead to some prisoner 
release.”140 A bill for the amnesty of the Tupamaros was submitted on August 4th. Despite the 
fact that amnesty had to be authorized by the Legislative Branch, many congressmen felt that 
they could not vote in favor of amnesty unless they had the approval of the Executive Branch so 
the bill did not pass.141 
The People’s Prison 
Meanwhile, Dan Mitrione and the other prisoners were being interrogated by Tupamaros 
in the People’s Prison, which was actually a collection of safe houses throughout Montevideo. 
Mitrione and Dias were held in the compound in the northern outskirts of the city, ironically just 
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fifteen blocks outside of the police’s perimeter.142 Reportedly, Mitrione was being held in “a 
house apparently located in the urban area, judging from noises audible outside. He was confined 
in a tent within a room, on the lower half of a wooden bunk bed, with a bucket for a toilet.”143 
From the beginning of his captivity, Mitrione was being interrogated as much as his condition 
allowed. 
The first priority for the Tupamaros was the organizations he worked for, since “the 
Tupamaros found three identification cards in his pocket. One was from the Department of State, 
Agency for International Development...There was also a card from the Montevideo Police 
Department, and one identifying Mitrione as a member of the FBI National Academy, Associates 
of Indiana.”144 The Tupamaros wanted to know about a multitude of subjects, including his 
advisory work in Uruguay and Brazil, the names of Americans and Uruguayans Mitrione had 
contact with, security conditions in the Embassy where Mitrione worked and CIA operations in 
Latin America.145 They also hoped to gather some evidence of Mitrione’s knowledge of more 
sinister practices, such as the death squads operating in Brazil and torture.146 
Having gathered enough evidence against their prisoners, the Tupamaros published 
Communique #6 at 1:05 a.m. on August 6th. The message was harrowing as it finally listed their 
victims’ crimes. In Communique #6, the Tupamaros stated, 
According to his own declarations, he has advised the Metropolitan Guard, the 
Republican Guard, and other repressive forces that in recent years have killed a dozen 
patriots in popular manifestations or in actions against revolutionary groups. Also, 
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according to his declarations, deadly arms have been provided for the repression of the 
Uruguayan people under the cynical emblem of AID.147 
   
The Tupamaros furthered their accusations by stating that “he is representative of a power that 
has massacred entire populations in Vietnam, Santo Domingo and other places.”148 The 
communique then presented the Uruguayan authorities with a deadline of midnight on August 7th 
to respond to the Tupamaros’ ransom demands. “In case there is no affirmative answer, we shall 
consider the case closed and will do justice. If the answer is favorable, we will wait until 
midnight on Tuesday the 11th for the conditions announced in previous notes to be put into 
effect.”149 The threat was clear; if the Uruguayan government did not agree to the terms, the 
victims would be executed. 
 Shortly following this announcement, Gallup published the results of a survey conducted 
between August 2nd and August 6th regarding the Uruguayan public’s opinions on the Tupamaros 
and the kidnappings. Their findings were that 
33 percent of Uruguayans considered the kidnappings an act of vandalism; 35 percent 
believed it was a legitimate revolutionary method…Moreover, 37 percent believed the 
government should provide ransom by releasing imprisoned terrorists; 37 percent 
believed the government should not…Finally, 60 percent believed that if kidnap victims 
were not ransomed, the terrorists would nevertheless return them safe and sound; 30 
percent believed the victims would not be returned.150 
 
In this sense, the public was becoming increasingly cynical towards the Tupamaros. It is also 
important to note that sixty percent believed that the Tupamaros would release their victims 
without harm. This opinion was widespread and shared by most of the Uruguayan government. 
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The Tupamaros had never killed a hostage before and Judge Daniel Pereira had been released 
after extensive interrogation. Most believed that the Tupamaros planned to “extract all 
information possible from the victims and then to publish as much derogatory information as 
possible. This would constitute the victims’ sentence.”151 Despite the Tupamaros’ threat in 
Communique #6, the large majority of Uruguay full-heartedly believed there was no way that 
they would kill their hostages even if the government did not meet the Tupamaros’ demands, 
especially considering the fact that the Tupamaros would lose public support in such an event.  
 Also, under the advisement of the US government, the Uruguayan government 
announced that they would offer a reward of one million pesos for any good information that 
would lead to the safe return of the hostages. The Ministry of Interior and Foreign Ministry 
developed an independent Citizens’ Information Center to anonymously take any tips, 
suggestions or other information that the public provided. The public increasingly volunteered 
information, which greatly aided police investigations.  
 On the evening of August 6th, the president repeated his commitment to upholding the 
Uruguayan Constitution, maintaining his stance of non-negotiation; the Uruguayan government 
let the deadline pass. The Tupamaros responded by kidnapping another victim the following 
morning to increase pressure on the Uruguayan government. The victim was a sixty-five year old 
American agricultural specialist named Dr. Claude L. Fly who had a history of health problems. 
At 9:15 a.m. on August 7th, three Tupamaros seized the soil expert from his laboratory. Facing 
increasing pressure, President Pacheco considering resigning from his post. This had been the 
Tupamaros’ goal, meaning that the Tupamaros had nearly won. Things seemed to be going their 
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way. In one Tupamaro’s words: “We had reached the most favorable stage in the crisis from our 
point of view, and the release or amnesty of our comrades seemed near.”152  
Almería 
 However, the Uruguayan police made a break in the case. Several high-ranking 
Tupamaro members had been reported in Malvín, the same neighborhood that Mitrione had been 
kidnapped from. At 8:00 in the morning, two police officers dressed as civilians forced their way 
into a ground-level apartment on Almería Street, subduing the Tupamaros guarding the place.153 
The police were in luck, because the Tupamaros were hosting a meeting that morning following 
the kidnapping of Dr. Fly, likely to discuss the next course of action and Mitrione’s fate. Police 
officers proceeded to conduct a typical ratonera, using the two captured Tupamaros to greet the 
unsuspecting Tupamaros, who would be arrested as soon as they entered. Nine Tupamaros were 
arrested, including three holding the hostages’ personal effects (Fly’s passport, Dias’ ring and 
Mitrione’s passport) and several high-ranking and coveted members of the Tupamaros, including 
founders, Efraín Martínez Platero and Raúl Sendic.154 In several hours, half of the existing 
Tupamaro leadership had been arrested. The devastating raid became known as Almería. 
It was a big win for the Uruguayan effort, reinvigorating both the government and the 
police, who both believed they were nearing the liberation of the hostages. Moreover, the 
public’s opinion of the police was at its height. President Pacheco decided against resignation 
and maintained his stance against negotiations. The Minister of the Interior “intended to 
undertake [the] most extreme police measures to locate [the] kidnap victims.”155 Interrogation 
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began immediately and the police intensified their searches, including a three hour search for 
Mitrione. The government believed that the police’s efforts and interrogations would bring a 
favorable end to the crisis. However, many worried that the arrests could threaten the hostages’ 
lives if the Tupamaros acted irrationally due to retaliation or lack of direction without their 
leaders.  
Concerned about the wellbeing of their comrades, the Tupamaros sent Communique #7 
directly to the police. The Tupamaros warned that “any inflicting of death or torture or any filing 
of accusations against the captured leaders would lead to severe reprisals.”156 The government 
took this threat seriously for all of the following “interrogations were monitored by judges of the 
Superior Court, and the terrorists were examined by physicians before and after questioning, to 
assure that no torture took place.”157 The same message was repeated on August 8th, when the 
Tupamaros threatened that the diplomats “will receive the same physical treatment as our 
arrested comrades” in Communique #8.158 However, the interrogators received no useful 
information. Raúl Sendic stated, “I am a prisoner of war. I will say nothing about the movement 
of which I am a part.”159 
Finding themselves at an impasse, the Uruguayan government made an unprecedented 
move. On August 7th, the government received permission from the Judicial Branch to use 
Sodium Pentothal, known as “truth serum” on the captured Tupamaros. The government then 
requested Argentinian police experts to help conduct the interrogation with this technology. The 
Argentinians arrived on the morning of August 8th to interrogate Raúl Sendic. However, they 
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were not informed of the conditions that they were required to work under, considering the 
Uruguayan commitment to the Constitution. 
Upon arriving, the Argentinians were surprised to read a disclosure of their mission in the 
Sunday newspapers, and to learn about the judicial monitoring. Since they had come 
under the condition of secrecy, they refused to proceed and returned to Argentina after 
witnessing an interrogation of Sendic. In their opinion, he was treated too gently, with 
interrogation conditions made extremely difficult by the presence of outside legal and 
medical assistance.160 
 
Reportedly, the closest the interrogators came to torture was splashing the naked prisoners with 
freezing cold water.161 However, in truth, most of the prisoners knew nothing at all, considering 
their commitment to compartmentalization. Apparently, only one of the captured Tupamaros 
knew where Mitrione was and it wasn’t Raúl Sendic, the reported “leader” of the Tupamaros. In 
actuality, Alberto Candán, a member of Column 15, the Tupamaro’s most active, held the 
knowledge that interrogators sought; he had interrogated Mitrione in the People’s Prison.  
 After Almería, new leaders had to be chosen, who had just lost some of their best. Raúl 
Sendic explained that “From the moment we go to jail we are incapable of doing anything at all, 
because we have a pre-existing protocol that says imprisoned Tupamaros lose all decision-
making authority.”162 There were slim pickings, considering the nearly one hundred fifty 
Tupamaros that were already imprisoned in the Punta Carretas prison. With few options left, the 
Tupamaros were forced to choose three new leaders for the executive committee from their 
ranks. All of the new leaders chosen came from the newer generation of Tupamaros; they were 
young, radical and inexperienced, but were active in operations. 
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The Death Sentence 
On the morning of August 8th, President Pacheco received a letter from Mitrione, directed 
to his wife. In a shaky hand, indicating emotional distress, Mitrione wrote: “Please advise the 
Ambassador to do all in his power to get me liberated because my life depends on it.”163 He 
wasn’t wrong. On the same afternoon, Communique #9 clearly stated the Tupamaros’ intent: “in 
view of the government’s refusal to exchange prisoners, the MLN had decided to execute 
Mitrione at noon the next day.”164 It had been decided amongst the Tupamaros. The majority of 
the Tupamaros supported Mitrione’s death. Some even wanted to murder Mitrione, Dias and Fly 
together for the greatest effect.165 The hostages were completely at the mercy of these new 
radical leaders. While the imprisoned Tupamaros maintained good communication with those 
outside, they had no impact on decision-making, meaning that the young violent radicals were 
entirely in charge of the operation. 
The government remained steadfast in their approach, even though the situation had 
deteriorated. They promised publicly that they were doing all that was possible to secure the 
releases of the Tupamaros’ hostages. The police continued raiding in a last effort and asked the 
public for their continued aid to find the kidnapped diplomats. Still, the government doubted that 
the Tupamaros would execute their captives. 
The United States became more persistent. While the American Ambassador had been 
actively involved in conversations regarding the best methods to secure the release of the 
hostages before, the United States respected the Uruguayan’s methods and competence. Before, 
Ambassador Adair had advocated, “For safe delivery Mitrione offer [the Tupamaros] amnesty or 
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amnesty plus an award 15 million pesos. Offer amnesty to key persons now being held in return 
for information leading to release of the three men.”166 However, by August 9th, the noon 
deadline was weighing on everybody’s minds. The United States increasingly advocated for 
reprisals against the Tupamaros.  
In an exclusive message to Ambassador Adair, the Secretary of State wrote just a half 
hour before the Mitrione’s deadline: “We have assumed that GOU has considered use of threat to 
kill Sendic and others key MLN prisoners if Mitrione is killed. If this has not been considered, 
you should raise it with GOU at once.”167 This was clearly a violation of Uruguayan law and 
would be a risky move within the government considering earlier concerns regarding dictatorial 
acts. When the Ambassador brought up the issue with the Foreign Minister in a last minute 
meeting, he stated that “his type of government did not permit such action.”168 In more blunt 
terms, President Pacheco reportedly told the Foreign Minister, “This guy is either drunk or off 
his rocker! What does he think Uruguay is? Viet Nam?”169 However, this didn’t mean the 
Uruguayan government was beyond extralegal methods either. 
During the same meeting, the Foreign Minister discussed another possibility in the case 
that Mitrione did not survive. Ambassador Adair informed the Secretary of State that “the GOU 
intends take what [redacted] called “severe measures” which he did not describe.”170 He later 
reported that the Foreign Minister “understood that through indirect means, a threat was made to 
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these prisoners that members of the “Escuadron de Muerte” (Illegal, Private Death Squad) would 
take action against the prisoners’ relatives if Mitrione werz [sic] killed.”171 This exchange came 
right before the noon deadline; if the Tupamaros carried through with their threat, Mitrione 
would soon be dead. However, many in the Uruguayan government believed that Mitrione was 
already dead as a result of his gunshot wound. Anonymous calls to the Uruguayan government 
had been announcing Mitrione’s death all day and rumors had been circulating throughout the 
city, making this threat very concerning.172 
The Tupamaros faced another blow to their organization. The newly appointed leadership 
was arrested after less than twenty-four hours in command. Now the Tupamaros were down nine 
more members. To make matters worse, it became clear that the Tupamaros had lost much of 
their public support, considering that “during several raiding operations, people filled the street, 
cheering and applauding the policemen as they placed suspects under suspension.”173 The 
Tupamaros were coming to the end of the line. 
Now the Tupamaros no longer had any leadership. There wasn’t even anybody to appoint 
new leaders. With nobody left to guide them, the remaining Tupamaros of Column 15 decided to 
execute Dan Mitrione, the prisoner in their custody. The self-appointed leader of the group 
recalled, “We saw it with the rigidity of young and inexperienced people. A certain day and time 
had been given as the deadline, and if the exchange was not accepted he was going to be 
executed. When we were left leaderless, we stuck to the wording of our press release.”174 
At 9:00 p.m., Mitrione was informed by his captors that he would be moved to a different 
location. His captors drugged him with valium before he was bound, blindfolded and placed in a 
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stolen car. They drove around for a while before switching cars and driving to a desolate 
location. In the early hours of the morning, the two shooters stopped the car and shot Dan 
Mitrione multiple times at close range. At 4:25 a.m., shortly after Mitrione was shot, a police 
patrol discovered the abandoned car. “Dan Mitrione’s body was found on the back seat of a 
stolen 1948 Buick convertible. He had been bound and gagged and shot twice in the head.”175 
During the autopsy, “examination of his body showed no signs of torture, binding, or other 
mistreatment. His earlier wound was clean and healing well.”176 It was official: Dan Mitrione 
was dead.  
 It immediately became clear to the Tupamaros that Mitrione’s assassination had severely 
damaged both their organization and their reputation. The popular response to the murder was 
one of disgust and revulsion; internationally and within Uruguay, the Tupamaros’ actions were 
condemned. August 11th marked a day of mourning in Uruguay for Dan Mitrione. Over five 
thousand Uruguayans visited the American embassy to pay their respects.177 Much of the public 
continued to inform the police of Tupamaro activity, seeing them now as more of a criminal 
element than a revolutionary group. Moreover, the public sympathized with Dan Mitrione, the 
slain father of nine. Originally, “the Tupamaros [had] expected that when Mitrione’s activities 
with the police were exposed, even apolitical Uruguayans would concede that he was a natural a 
target.”178 Yet the Tupamaros were not able to expose him as a CIA agent involved in torture or 
provide any other damaging material.179 However, Sendic later stated that the Tupamaros had 
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targeted for teaching riot control procedures to the Uruguayan police that led to the deaths of 
protesters.180 
Allegations Against Mitrione 
The questions that still linger with Mitrione is whether he was a CIA officer and whether 
he was involved in torture during his time with OPS To this day, this is still a controversial 
question. It’s a complicated history and everybody has a stake in the answers. Dan Mitrione was 
stationed in Uruguay in 1969. Previously, he had worked as an advisor in Brazil for seven years. 
Officially, Dan Mitrione’s position as a Public Safety Advisor entailed making requisitions for 
weapons and supplies and training officers to improve investigations with the tools that the AID 
program provided. He also worked to improve communications between police, traveling 
throughout Uruguay to inspect police stations. Lastly, Mitrione was tasked with choosing 
officers for further training in the United States. Of course, the real purpose of OPS was to fight 
communism within Latin America which involved more dubious practices. 
As Chief Police Advisor, Dan Mitrione was stationed within the American Embassy, 
alongside other OPS advisors. It’s well established that CIA officers were often imbedded within 
the Embassy, especially in the OPS program. This allowed them close access to important 
figures and supplies, considering that illicit equipment was often brought in through the 
embassy’s diplomatic pouch.181 In fact, when Mitrione took his position, he replaced a CIA 
officer, William Cantrell. Some astute policers suspected Mitrione of being a CIA officer 
because he was well-equipped and well-connected. However, that was his job as Chief Police 
Advisor in Montevideo. Despite this, leftists declared that “his AID credentials fooled no one. 
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Mr. Mitrione was a well-known CIA agent.”182 This rumor was established as far away as East 
Germany, when a publisher listed Mitrione in a book entitled Who’s Who in CIA.183 Of course, 
the CIA denied the allegations that Mitrione was one of theirs. Others believe that Mitrione was 
merely ambitious and cooperated with the CIA officers that worked within Uruguay.184 
Naturally, interrogation is an integral part of any police institution and would be the focus 
of training any good detective. However, it is clear that the United States actively taught police 
and military officers enhanced interrogation techniques through the International Police 
Academy and the School of the Americas. Throughout Latin America, American influence and 
torture seemed to go hand in hand. During Mitrione’s time in Brazil, prisoners “attributed the 
new Brazilian efficiency to United States training. Before the US advisers helped to centralize 
information, it had taken days to discover whether a new prisoner was a leader in the rebel 
movement. Now it took hours.”185 Reportedly, police officers attended forty minute classes on 
torture that used political prisoners to illustrate the techniques.186 However, this does not 
necessarily mean that Dan Mitrione was behind the new techniques. When discussing what 
Mitrione would do if he witnessed Brazilian police abusing a prisoner, a Brazilian police officer 
replied that he would merely leave the room.187 
The accusations that Dan Mitrione taught torture techniques or led interrogations in 
Uruguay came from three men, representing very different interests. There was Alejandro Otero, 
an Uruguayan police officer, who had been trained in counterintelligence by both the 
Argentinian Information Service and AID’s International Police Academy, before being 
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recruited by the CIA.188 There was also Miguel Angel Benítez Segovia, who was a Tupamaro 
working undercover as a police officer.189 Finally, the most bizarre accuser was “Manuel the 
Cuban.” Manuel Hevia was a Cuban who was studying in the US when he was recruited by the 
CIA. Manuel accepted the position and was sent to work undercover in the Uruguayan embassy. 
However, in reality, he was a Cuban double agent.190 
Alejandro Otero was an ambitious detective and a well-known figure in Uruguay, due to 
his frequent press releases on police activity and the Tupamaros. In 1969, he spoke openly about 
police brutality when he was interviewed by an Argentine reporter. 191 He talked about his friend, 
a Tupamaro supporter, who had been interrogated by the police. She told him that Mitrione had 
watched and assisted in her torture. When he confronted Dan Mitrione, he listened 
“impassively.” Afterwards, Otero was “put on ice” before losing his job over the interview.192 
Otero repeated the same story to a Brazilian journalist four days after Mitrione’s death.  
US advisers, especially Mitrione, had introduced scientific methods of torture…The 
advisors advocated psychological torture, Otero told Aymoré [the journalist], to create 
despair. In the next room, they would play tapes of women and children screaming and 
tell the prisoner that it was his family being tortured. They used electrical shocks under 
fingernails, on the genitals. He told Aymoré about his friend, the woman who had been 
tortured, and about the way Mitrione ignored his protests. Mitrione had been very hard in 
his methods, Otero said.193 
 
Shortly afterwards, Alejandro Otero recanted his story. Considering the Brazilian police’s 
allegiance to Mitrione, it seems possible that he may have been threatened by the death squads.  
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Working undercover in the Uruguayan police, Miguel Angel Benítez recorded 
information about the inner workings and key players, including Mitrione. In one report, he 
recorded a conversation he overheard where Mitrione offered advice to officers: “undress him 
completely and force him to stand facing the wall. Then have one of the youngest policemen 
goose him. Afterward, put him into a cell and hold him for three days with nothing to drink. On 
the third day, pass through to him a pot of water mixed with urine.”194 The advice was meant as a 
joke, considering its sexual overtones. However, alongside Mitrione’s joking advice, “he had 
always emphasized finding out as much as possible about a prisoner before the interrogation 
began. Learn the suspect’s breaking point and reach it quickly, he told the interrogating 
officers.”195 When teaching about torture, much of the information that Americans provided was 
hypothetical; while students were taught techniques, instructors would not directly advocate 
them, however the message was clear.  
Benítez never saw Mitrione torture a prisoner, but he knew that he had directed several 
interrogations. He also credited the changes within the police station to Mitrione. “When 
Mitrione arrived in Montevideo, the police were torturing prisoners with a rudimentary electric 
needle that had come from Argentina. Mitrione arranged for the police to get newer electric 
needles of varying thickness. Some needles were so thin they could be slipped between the 
teeth.”196 Like in Brazil, other Uruguayan officers recall Mitrione casually walking in on 
interrogations, where Tupamaros were being tortured.197 
The most damning information came from the Cuban agent. Hevia reported that he had 
been invited to Mitrione’s house, where he had built a soundproofed cellar to teach officers 
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torture techniques. Graduates of the International Police Academy would gather in his cellar, 
where Mitrione provided bichicones, or beggars to demonstrate the effects of electrical shock on 
various portions of the body. He goes on to describe a lengthy conversation the two shared, 
where Mitrione described his philosophy of interrogation. “After all that, the interrogation 
begins. Now the only pain should come from the instrument you’ve chosen to use. Mitrione said, 
“the precise pain, in the precise place, in the precise amount to achieve the effect.”198 However, 
as a Cuban agent, he clearly had a strong motivation to discredit Yankee involvement in Latin 
America. 
Even though all three accounts clearly accuse Dan Mitrione of involvement in torture, it 
is clear that his story is complicated. All three represent different allegiances, yet all have 
different stories. Otero was guided by his morals. Even if he was on the CIA’s payroll, he was 
arguably most affiliated with Uruguayan interests. For this reason, I find his account to be 
persuasive, since he was notably candid in his interviews and had little motivation to paint 
Mitrione in a negative light. Likewise, I believe Benítez is a credible source, considering the fact 
that the statements he sent to the Tupamaros were modest and unexaggerated. Both of their 
statements are consistent with police officers who had contact with Dan Mitrione in Brazil and 
Uruguay. 
Based on the various testimonies, I am of the opinion that Daniel Mitrione was aware of 
the prisoner abuse and torture that occurred. At minimum, he facilitated the practice by sending 
officers to learn torture techniques at the International Police Academy and School of Americas. 
As a Public Safety Officer, he also acquired equipment, such as electric generators and needles 
for officers to use, knowing full well what they were intended for. Moreover, based on officers’ 
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testimonies, Mitrione seemed comfortable with the practice, willingly walking into interrogation 
rooms and discussing the practice. I strongly believe that Mitrione kept his hands clean; while he 
may have advocated and instructed on methods of torture, he never partook. This sentiment is 
corroborated by the fact that the Tupamaros were never able to prove that Mitrione tortured 
prisoners, even with members imbedded in the police.   
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Uruguay’s Moral Decline 
  
Directly following the murder of Dan Mitrione, the Uruguayan government issued 
emergency security measures. At 5:15 p.m. on August 10th, the same day Mitrione had been 
killed, the General Assembly “voted to waive temporarily the rights guaranteed under Article 31 
of Uruguay’s Constitution. Declaring a state of emergency, the assembly suspended for twenty 
days the rights of property, assembly, personal liberty and free expression,”199 leading Uruguay 
in its path towards a dictatorship. 
Meanwhile, the Tupamaros continued their campaign of violent operations as part of the 
next phase of the revolution. These new operations were increasingly terroristic, which was a 
clear divergence from their earlier philosophy. In September, the Tupamaros launched Plan 
Cacao, a campaign of bombings that targeted symbols of oligarchies and imperialism, even if 
they housed innocent civilians. Plan Satán continued on; hostages were gradually ransomed off 
and new victims were kidnapped, including the British Ambassador, Geoffrey Jackson, who was 
kidnapped in January of 1971. The Tupamaros also continued Línea Hostigamiento, killing 
police officers indiscriminately. By this time, the Tupamaros had lost much of the support from 
the Uruguayan public due to their reign of terror. However, the Tupamaros were certainly not 
dead, and they had no intention of stopping. In fact, their organization had reached peak 
recruitment, as angry radical youths joined the organization.200 
In the summer of 1971, the Tupamaros worked to free their comrades. They planned to 
use the sewers, which they had been mapping meticulously since 1965.201 After a few scrapped 
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plans, the Tupamaros settled on Operación Estrella. In the Tres Cruces neighborhood, the 
Tupamaros tunneled to the women’s prison from the sewers. At about 8:30 p.m., the Tupamaros 
broke through the last of the floor, while the prisoners loudly danced to hide the noise. With that 
portion complete, the Tupamaras returned to their cells and prepared dummies to hide their 
escape. Then at 10:00 p.m., the Tupamaras returned to the hole and made their escape, where 
they were guided by their comrades through the sewers to a hijacked home.202 In total, thirty-
eight women escaped on July 17th, 1971. 
The Tupamaros success was replicated three months later when one hundred eleven 
prisoners escaped from Puntas Carretas. Within the prison, Tupamaros tunneled between cells 
and from the first floor to the ground floor to reach their escape tunnel. On September 5th, they 
traveled through the forty foot tunnel that connected to a house across the street, which was held 
hostage by Tupamaros. There, the prisoners were provided with false papers and an escape route. 
In total, one hundred six Tupamaros escaped, leaving only seventy-four Tupamaros in prison. 
The Tupamaros had effectively freed all of their leaders, as well as their most skilled and 
talented members. However, as a result of the two prison escapes, the state lost faith in the 
police’s ability to combat the Tupamaros. On September 9th, 1971, the military was given full 
control of the anti-terrorist campaign against the Tupamaros. 
Immediately following the prison break, the Tupamaros called an unprecedented 
armistice for the coming election. A new party emerged that provided an alternative to 
Uruguay’s conservative politicians. The Frente Amplio was a coalition of socialists, communists 
and Christian democrats campaigning on the premise of land redistribution, nationalizing banks 
and renegotiating Uruguay’s immense foreign debt, which had reached five hundred million.203 
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Inspired by Salvador Allende’s recent success in Chile, the Tupamaros supported the Frente 
Amplio even though it was contrary to their philosophy.  
The coalition was certainly controversial; they were considered either Uruguay’s last 
chance to avoid a civil war or a revolutionary mobilization that would lead the country to 
communism.204 While many supported an alternative to the traditional corrupt politicians, they 
were alienated by the strong presence of the Communist Party. In the end, the traditional parties 
won with the triumph of the Colorado Party. Juan María Bordaberry, who was handpicked by 
President Pacheco, won the election. As a fervent anti-communist with an inclination towards 
fascism, Bordaberry planned to follow Pacheco’s policies to eliminate the Tupamaros by using 
extraordinary presidential and police powers.205 
With the new president inaugurated, the Tupamaros resumed their campaign against the 
state on April 14th, 1972 by assassinating four members of the death squad.206 The Tupamaros 
were not prepared for the state’s response. While they had been on hiatus, the military had been 
preparing for a more effective anti-subversive campaign. And on April 15th, President 
Bordaberry acquired additional emergency powers, declaring a state of internal war. Under 
martial law, the military was empowered in their campaign against the Tupamaros, who were 
subject to military courts. Between April and June, over one thousand suspects were arrested.207 
Moreover, it was clear that the military was torturing suspects to garner more information. On 
July 11th, Congress passed an anti-subversion law which subjected accused subversives to 
military courts and suspended individual rights, allowing searches without a warrant and 
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imprisonment on suspicion of subversion.208 The new anti-subversion law “gave juridical 
recognition to the suspension of individual liberties and the violent repression that had been 
conducted under the declaration.”209 By July 15th, the military announced that they had 
discovered seventy safe houses, captured over six hundred Tupamaros and killed one hundred.210  
 The state of internal war allowed the military more leeway in their campaign against 
subversion. Their success came from a reliance on enhanced interrogation techniques.  
Suspected Tupamaro collaborators were said to be subjected to a routine consisting of, 
perhaps, two days of planton (prolonged standing without food), a week of capucha 
(completely blindfolded imprisonment), and a few mornings of submarinos (immersion 
of the prisoner’s head in water, up to the point of asphyxiation, every half hour or so). 
During the interrogation proper, prisoners were supposedly beaten in ways that are hard 
to trace - for instance, by simultaneous blows against the ears. Forms of psychological 
torture (such as interruption of sleep, withholding of food or drink, and threats) and drug-
induced confessions were also frequently reported.211 
  
Like other guerrilla groups, the Tupamaros had a policy of enduring torture for twenty-four 
hours to provide the rest of the organization time to escape. However, the military’s campaign 
was too prolific to maintain this safeguard. Under duress, there was little choice but to talk. And 
considering the fact that many Tupamaros had been to prison, they would be able to identify 
more members. In this manner, the military was provided a plethora of information regarding 
members, associates and safe houses. By the end of 1972, about five thousand people had been 
arrested by the military and three thousand Tupamaros were being held.212 Roughly seven 
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hundred Tupamaros fled the country and three hundred Tupamaros remained at large.213 The 
Tupamaros had come to an end; their organization was destroyed. 
 At this point, only four percent of the Uruguayans believed that the Tupamaros were 
motivated by social justice, compared to sixty percent the year before.214 Despite this, the 
Tupamaros had a peculiar effect on the military, who were becoming increasingly politicized. 
“All of them, it appears, condemned the guerrilla movement for its lawless violence, but some 
were convinced of the rightness of the Tupamaros’ demands for radical reform by the capture of 
proofs they had assembled of extensive injustice and corruption in the existing regime.”215 Now 
that the Tupamaros were in military custody, there was an exchange of political ideas that was 
not previously possible. As military officers became more familiar with their prisoners, the 
military gained an understanding of the reasoning behind the Tupamaros and the ways they had 
hoped to better Uruguayan society.216 More importantly, the Tupamaros shared evidence of 
corruption in the highest spheres, from businessmen to politicians.217 Uruguay’s political 
processes had been discredited, leading the military to demand a larger role in politics. 
 As a result of the Tupamaros’ accounts, the military demanded extensive reforms to 
address the economic problems and rampant corruption in February of 1973. It was clear that a 
revolt was brewing, but the military’s complaints rang true for most Uruguayans.218 When their 
ultimatum was disregarded, the military demonstrated their force on February 12th, “when 
fourteen vintage tanks lumbered through the capital to Prado Park, near the Presidential 
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residence;” the president was forced to surrender.219 “Henceforth the armed forces would play a 
new role in public life with the mission to safeguard national developments.”220 The military 
would advise the president through the newly inaugurated National Security Commission, 
allowing the military to maintain a democratic façade. However, the reality was clear. 
 On June 27th, 1973, President Bordaberry illegally dissolved Congress under the 
military’s advisement. The Uruguayan public challenged this development with protests and 
demonstrations. Police reported that mobs of up to two thousand people gathered at the Plaza 
Independencia, where the president is located. Over two hundred people were arrested on one 
night for illegal assembly and activity, including firebombing vehicles and stoning or shooting 
military and police personnel.221 Demonstrations were quelled after two weeks. Political activity 
was forbidden and censorship was imposed to stifle criticism.222 “Widespread repression was 
then unleashed, with the arrest of leading political figures of all parties, trade unionists and 
members of the university.”223 After the successful elimination of civilian protests and the 
oppositional left, Uruguay was unable to prevent the end of democracy. Uruguay was at the 
mercy of the authoritarian civil – military dictatorship that had taken root. 
The new regime defended the illegal measures taken, proclaiming that they were saving 
their country by “rooting out corruption of the past and drawing the line for a new morality and 
new approach to their country’s problems.”224 The main focus was the economy, which had 
deteriorated significantly in the last few years. In order to solve their country’s economic issues, 
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the military knew that they needed “an experienced civilian leader who was better qualified” to 
implement the Brazilian-inspired development policy.225 When discussing the new regime in 
Uruguay, President Bordaberry told the American Ambassador that 
It would be a great mistake if Americans were to interpret developments here in any way 
as the establishment of a military regime in Uruguay. If the military had wanted to take 
power, he said, there would have been nothing to prevent their doing so. The fact is, he 
said, that the military did not want to take power, but rather to develop a stronger level of 
participation in government by providing the civilian governmnt [sic] with the necessary 
authority to have a chance of solving the obvious problems which had been plaguing the 
country for such along [sic] time…In the long run, he said, everything they have done has 
really been an effort to end the stagnation of more than two decades and to save 
Uruguay’s democratic traditions and institutions rather do violence to them.226 
  
In this manner, President Bordaberry defended Uruguay’s loss of democracy and the new 
authoritarian regime. Uruguay would remain under a repressive military-led dictatorship for 
twelve years. During this time period, several thousand political prisoners, including a large 
number of Tupamaros, were held captive and tortured. Uruguay had the highest per capita ratio 
of political prisoners in the world, with one of every fifty-four Uruguayan citizens detained.227 
The country remained under a military-led dictatorship until 1985, when the armed allowed the 
transfer of power to a civilian leader. 
Conclusion 
 Ironically, the Tupamaros’ efforts to ignite a revolution and overthrow the government 
led to the collapse of democracy in Uruguay. Plan Satán had been intended to unseat President 
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Pacheco, which was nearly successful. However, in a turn of events, several of the Tupamaros’ 
leaders were captured. Reinvigorated, President Pacheco renewed his efforts pertinaciously, 
determined to bring an end to the guerrilla group that had threatened his rule. However, before he 
could triumph over the Tupamaros, Daniel Mitrione was killed. More determined than ever to 
prevent another death at the hands of the Tupamaros, President Pacheco proclaimed a state of 
emergency, enacting a number of security measures to bring an end to this affair. These 
measures allowed the police to continue their search with little hindrance. As the election neared, 
President Pacheco intended to run for another term, but he was prevented by the Constitution. He 
proceeded to choose his successor, Juan María Bordaberry, who successfully won the election. 
Bordaberry continued Pacheco’s campaign, continuing the string of security measures. Finally in 
April of 1972, Bordaberry declared martial law and allowed the military to take control of 
operations against the Tupamaros. As a result, the military became more politicized and sought 
dominion over the government, leading to the military coup of 1973. 
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